Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings

Sean Griffith
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Sean Griffith: University of Connecticut

University of Connecticut School of Law Working Papers from University of Connecticut School of Law

Abstract: This article investigates the preferential allocation, or "spinning," of shares in initial public offerings. It begins by examining the offering process and the incentives of underwriters, issuers, and investors. Through this examination of the participants and the process, it locates the harm of spinning in the underpricing of initial public offerings. The article then seeks to identify precisely which participants in the offering process are harmed by the practice and finally evaluates the most appropriate means of addressing this harm.

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