Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example

Gregory Alexander
Additional contact information
Gregory Alexander: Cornell Law School

Cornell Law School Working Papers from Cornell Law School

Abstract: This article examines an apparent paradox in comparative constitutional law. Property rights are not treated as a fundamental right in American constitutional law; they are, however, under the Basic Law (i.e., constitution) of Germany, a social-welfare state that otherwise gives less weight to property. The article uses this apparent paradox as a vehicle for considering the different reasons why constitutions protect property. It explains the difference between the German and American constitutional treatment of property on the basis of the quite different approaches taken in the two systems to the purposes of constitutional protection of property.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=cornell/clsops (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bep:cornel:cornell_clsops-1003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cornell Law School Working Papers from Cornell Law School
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().