Vertrauen und Recht: eine ökonomische Analyse
Additional contact information
Dieter Schmidtchen: uni-saarland
No 2001-default/2001/1-1018, German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press
In this article a simple game is used to develop a concept of trust that takes account of boundedly rational behavior. Even if a first mover in a sequential game is protected against opportunism by legal means or means of private ordering there remains a risk that the second mover does not perform as promised. Trust consists of accepting this risk. The paper also discusses the efficiency of trust and the role of the law in separating trustworthy from non trustworthy people.
Keywords: Trust; trust game; law; detection skills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bep:dewple:2001-default/2001/1-1018
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().