Vertrauen und Recht: eine ökonomische Analyse

Dieter Schmidtchen
Additional contact information
Dieter Schmidtchen: uni-saarland

German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press

Abstract: In this article a simple game is used to develop a concept of trust that takes account of boundedly rational behavior. Even if a first mover in a sequential game is protected against opportunism by legal means or means of private ordering there remains a risk that the second mover does not perform as promised. Trust consists of accepting this risk. The paper also discusses the efficiency of trust and the role of the law in separating trustworthy from non trustworthy people.

Keywords: Trust; trust game; law; detection skills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: oai:bepress:
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=gwp (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bep:dewple:2001-default/2001/1-1018

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().