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When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Gerrit De Geest
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Gerrit De Geest: Utrecht University

No 2002-1-1051, German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press

Abstract: Judgment proof injurers can be expected to take less than optimal precaution, as they bear only a part of the accident loss. However, it has been showed that under certain conditions the judgment proof problem can lead to overprecaution. We argue that overprecaution can never occur in magnitude models (where more precaution only reduces the magnitude of the harm) as opposed to the probability models traditionally used in the literature (where more precaution only reduces the probability of the accident). We also analyze mixed models and discuss the policy implications of our analysis.

Keywords: insolvency; judgment proof problem; liability; bankruptcy; overprecaution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Related works:
Journal Article: When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution? (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution? (2004) Downloads
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