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The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch

Anne van Aaken (), Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt ()
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Eli Salzberger: University of Haifa

No 2003-1-1062, German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press

Abstract: Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries; from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared.

Keywords: Separation of Powers; Public Prosecution; Government Offences; and Positive Constitutional Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K40 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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