Roland Kirstein and
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Robert Cooter: University of California, Berkeley
No 2005-1-1131, German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press
Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti- Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium.
JEL-codes: C D L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Anti-Sharing (2005)
Working Paper: Anti-Sharing (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bep:dewple:2005-1-1131
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