Anti-Sharing

Roland Kirstein and Robert Cooter
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Robert Cooter: University of California, Berkeley

No 2005-1-1131, German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press

Abstract: Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti- Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium.

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