Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game

Rimawan Pradiptyo

No 2006-1-1142, German Working Papers in Law and Economics from Berkeley Electronic Press

Abstract: We attempt to revise the inspection game used by Tsebelis (1989, 1990, 1993 and Tsebelis in Bianco et al, 1990) to model phenomena in criminal justice. Recent findings from various studies, primarily conducted in the UK, are used to re-construct the game. In contrast to Tsebelis' (1989) propositions, we found that the severity of punishment may affect individuals' offending behaviour. Similar results can be found for the case in which the authority initiates crime prevention initiatives by providing incentives to law abiding individuals. Any attempts to increase the severity of punishment are less certain in reducing individuals' offending behaviour than crime prevention initiatives. This result holds so long as the authority does not alter the levels of enforcement and the severity of punishment.

Keywords: Punishment; Deterrence effect; Crime prevention; Game theory, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-law
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Journal Article: Does Punishment Matter? A Refinement of the Inspection Game (2007)
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