THE ECONOMY OF PROPERTY FORMS

Michael Heller
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Michael Heller: University of Michigan

No 1-1-1007, Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology from Berkeley Electronic Press

Abstract: This essay explores a puzzle from the world of property theory, that is from the world of mine and yours, the basic social organizational molecules with which we build our sense of justice. The puzzle is this: why is there so little variety in the forms of property people use across the world? We lack a convincing theory for the "economy of property forms," where economy is understood in the sense of parsimony. Three partial answers have been suggested. First, the limited number of forms may keep people from wasting property through over-fragmentation. Second, the limit may economize on communication costs for third parties who want to buy or sell property. Third, the limit may be an inexpensive way to help verify ownership. But none of these theories accounts for why obsolete forms persist in many economies, and why value-increasing forms fail to be created. Perhaps a more satisfying answer will require looking to political economy and to cognitive psychology. For now, the economy of property forms remains a provocative question.

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