The Economic Case for Cyberinsurance

Jay Kesan, Rupterto Majuca and William Yurcik
Additional contact information
Jay Kesan: University of Illinois College of Law
Rupterto Majuca: Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
William Yurcik: National Center for Supercomputing Applications, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

University of Illinois Legal Working Paper Series from University of Illinois College of Law

Abstract: We present three economic arguments for cyberinsurance. First, cyberinsurance results in higher security investment, increasing the level of safety for information technology (IT) infrastructure. Second, cyberinsurance facilitates standards for best practices as cyberinsurers seek benchmark security levels for risk management decision-making. Third, the creation of an IT security insurance market redresses IT security market failure resulting in higher overall societal welfare. We conclude that this is a significant theoretical foundation, in addition to market-based evidence, to support the assertion that cyberinsurance is the preferred market solution to managing IT security risks.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=uiuclwps (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bep:illlwp:uiuclwps-1001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of Illinois Legal Working Paper Series from University of Illinois College of Law
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().