PAIR-WISE PARETO OPTIMALITY, NUMBER OF VOTERS, AND THE EXISTENCE OF MAJORITY RULE EQUILIBRIUM

Sadik Gokturk
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Sadik Gokturk: St. Johns University

No 1010, International Trade and Finance Association Conference Papers from International Trade and Finance Association

Abstract: The existence of equilibrium for majority rule is shown under the assumption of a certain condition of pairwise symmetry and without restricting the number of voters to only odd cases. Plott had studied a special case of this problem by placing a strict symmetry condition on the preferences of pairs of voters and restricting the number of voters to odd only. It has been remarked by a large number of theorists that Plott's symmetry condition is sufficient, but not necessary, for the existence of majority rule equilibrium. Moreover, while intuitively quite appealing, the assumption of the oddness of the number of voters should be relaxed, if possible. This paper assumes a different and weaker symmetry condition and does away with the assumption of an odd number of voters in the proof of the existence of equilibrium for majority rule.Presented at the 12th International Conference in Bangkok, Thailand, May 2002.

Date: 2002-04-29
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