Kill Zone

Sai Kamepalli (), Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales
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Sai Kamepalli: University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

No 2020-19, Working Papers from Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics

Abstract: We study why high-priced acquisitions of entrants by an incumbent do not necessarily stimulate more innovation and entry in an industry (like that of digital platforms) where customers face switching costs and enjoy network externalities. The prospect of an acquisition by the incumbent platform undermines early adoption by customers, reducing prospective payoffs to new entrants. This creates a “kill zone†in the space of startups, as described by venture capitalists, where new ventures are not worth funding. Evidence from changes in investment in startups by venture capitalists after major acquisitions by Facebook and Google suggests this is more than a mere theoretical possibility.

Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ent, nep-ino and nep-pay
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://repec.bfi.uchicago.edu/RePEc/pdfs/BFI_WP_202019.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Kill Zone (2020)
Working Paper: Kill Zone (2020)
Working Paper: Kill Zone (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-19

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