Public Liquidity Demand and Central Bank Independence

Jean Barth Lemy, Eric Mengus and Guillaume Plantin
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jean Barthélemy

Working papers from Banque de France

Abstract: This paper studies how private demand for public liquidity affects the independence of a central bank vis- -vis the fiscal authority. Whereas supplying liquidity to the private sector creates degrees of freedom for fiscal and monetary authorities vis- -vis each other, we show that the authority that is most able to attract private liquidity demand can ultimately impose its views to the other.

Keywords: : Central Bank Independence; Low Rates; Game of Chicken; Demand for Liquidity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 E42 E50 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/defaul ... /documents/wp747.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Public Liquidity Demand and Central Bank Independence (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfr:banfra:747

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Banque de France Banque de France 31 Rue Croix des Petits Champs LABOLOG - 49-1404 75049 PARIS. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael brassart ().