Partnership in Open Innovation

Xavier Martinez-Giralt and Rosella Nicolini

No 101, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to create R&D agreements. We study a Bertrand duopoly where firms evaluate the returns of an agreement according to its length. A learning process allows us to depict a close connection between firms' technology and the possibility to achieve a positive outcome from creating an agreement. Moreover, as far as learning is modeled as an iterative process, a suitable set of initial conditions is the basic factor leading to successful ventures.

Keywords: Firm agreements; learning; Open Innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:101

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