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Executive Constraints as Robust Control

Timothy Besley () and Hannes Mueller

No 1054, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper looks at the case for executive constraints in a world of imperfect electoral accountability and policy risk. It develops a model in which policy can be subject to judicial oversight by an imperfectly informed judiciary. Limiting discretion can be good for reducing risk but can worsen incentives creating a non-trivial trade-off for voters. We argue that this is always resolved in favor of executive constraints when looking at the worst case scenario meaning that executive constraints are best justified as a form of robust control.

Keywords: political institutions; robust control; checks and balances; elections; executive constraints; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D60 D72 E02 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pol
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