Transaction-tax Evasion in the Housing Market

Josep M. Raya, Amedeo Piolatto and José García-Montalvo

No 1080, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We model the behaviour of a mortgagor considering to evade the real estate transfer tax. We build an observable measure of over-appraisal that is inversely related with tax evasion and conclude that the tax authority could focus auditing efforts on low-appraisal transactions. We include `behavioural' components (shame and stigma) allowing to introduce buyers' and societal characteristics that explain individual and idiosyncratic variations. Our empirical analysis confirms the predictions using a unique database for Spain, where we directly observe: real payment, value declared to the authority, appraisal, buyers' educational level and local levels of corruption and trust.

Keywords: mortgage; Tax evasion; transfer tax; housing market; appraisal; Loan-To-Value; tax-morale JEL classiffication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 H26 R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/1080-file.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market (2020)
Working Paper: Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market (2019)
Working Paper: Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1080

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().