Partisan Competition, Growth and the Franchise

Robert Oxoby and Humberto Llavador

No 109, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: The nineteenth century was a time of substantial changes in the patterns of economic growth. This was also a period of significant fluctuations in the structure of and allocation of political rights. Through successive franchise extensions, democracy expanded dramatically, giving birth to the first wave of democratization. The concurrence of these changes in the patterns of economic growth and political voice are not coincidental. In this paper we develop a general equilibrium model of political competition in which ideological parties representing elites use the allocation of voting rights to influence implemented policies. In turn, these policies influence the character of economic growth. We find in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there exist an economic conflict among the elite, (2) the landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of urban (industrial) workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. Hence, too much and too little democracy can be bad for growth. Furthermore, economic growth may, ceteris paribus, naturally lead to diffusion of voting rights.

Keywords: growth; Franchise; political competition; elites; industrialization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 N10 O41 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise (2005)
Working Paper: Partisan competition, growth and the franchise (2004)
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