Daunou's Voting Rule and the Lexicographic Assignment of Priorities

Kotaro Suzumura, Walter Bossert and Salvador Barberà ()

No 1107, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.

Keywords: voting rules; Daunou's method; Condorcet criterion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-his, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities (2021)
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