Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions

Mariann Ollár and Antonio Penta ()

No 1126, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider mechanism design environments in which agents commonly know that types are identically distributed across agents, but without assuming that the actual distribution is common knowledge, nor that it is known to the designer (common knowledge of identicality). Under these assumptions, we explore problems of partial and full implementation, as well as robustness. First, we characterize the transfers which are incentive compatible under the assumption of common knowledge of identicality, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for partial implementation. Second, we characterize the conditions under which full implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, as well as the transfer schemes which achieve full implementation whenever it is possible. Finally, we study the robustness properties of the implementing transfers with respect to misspecifications of agents' preferences and with respect to lower orders beliefs in rationality.

Keywords: Rationalizability; moment conditions; robust full implementation; interdependent values; identical but unknown distributions; uniqueness; strategic externalities; canonical transfers; loading transfers; equal-externality transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1126

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