On Strategic Transmission of Gradually Arriving Information

Alexander Frug

No 1146, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: The main insight of the literature on strategic information transmission is that even a small conflict of interest between a fully informed sender (e.g., a financial adviser) and an uninformed receiver (an investor) often poses considerable difficulties for effective communication. However, in many real-life situations, the sender is not fully informed at the outset but gradually studies the case before offering advice. The gradual arrival of information to the sender weakens the strategic barriers between the players and significantly improves communication.

Keywords: cheap talk; gradual learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
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Working Paper: On strategic transmission of gradually arriving information (2019)
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