The Organization of Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis

Benito Arruñada
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Benito Arruñada

No 1154, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This chapter analyzes the main tradeoffs in the organization of public registries, comparing five forms of organization: (1) the bureaucracies or "discretionary expense centers" used to provide privately valuable services in the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them, and the hybrid solutions that have been used by the liberal state since the 19th century to provide such privately valuable services, including (3) revenue centers based on user fees; (4) franchised systems in which professional civil servants are paid from the profit of an office; and (5) the contemporary variant in which the Government contracts out the provision of the whole service to a private firm. This comparison suggests that market forces may play a better role in organizing public registries when they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible while, at the same time, reducing the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff.

Keywords: competition; welfare; incentives; Bureaucracy; registries; internal markets; user fees; user choice; privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H42 H51 H52 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Working Paper: The organization of public registries: A comparative analysis (2021)
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