Doctors Without Borders? Re-licensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians

Adriana Kugler and Robert Sauer

No 133, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders are widespread. In this paper, we measure the effects of occupational licensing by exploiting an immigrant physician re-training assignment rule. Instrumental variables and quantile treatment effects estimates indicate large returns to acquiring an occupational license and negative selection into licensing status. We also develop a model of optimal license acquisition which, together with the empirical results, suggests that stricter re-licensing requirements may not only lead to practitioner rents, but also to lower average quality of service in the market for physicians.

Date: 2004-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/133.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Doctors without Borders? Relicensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians (2005)
Working Paper: Doctors without Borders? Relicensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:133

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