Strategic Delegation in Monetary Unions

Varadarajan Chari, Larry Jones and Ramon Marimon

No 135, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation- that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

JEL-codes: E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Delegation in Monetary Unions (2004)
Working Paper: Strategic delegation in monetary unions (2004)
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