Political Correctness and Elite Prestige

Javier Ortega and Esther Hauk

No 1375, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Consider a society where the prestige of orthodox views is linked to the prestige of the elite. Heterodox individuals are less likely to express their views if other peers refrain from doing so and if the elite is prestigious. In turn, corruption by the elite is less easily detected if orthodox views dominate. We characterize equilibrium self-denial and corruption and show that an exogenous increase in the range of orthodox views may result in a decrease in the total number of individuals truthfully expressing their views. Some features of the model are shown to be compatible with U.S. data.

Keywords: preference falsification; political correctness; Overton window; social pressure; conformity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D7 Z1 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Working Paper: Political correctness and elite prestige (2023)
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