Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties

Danilo Coelho and Salvador BarberÃ

No 1442, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially conflicting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two conflicting firms, and ii) the bipartisan coalition's selection of a set of judges to occupy court vacancies. We analyze the efficiency, fairness, and simplicity of equilibrium outcomes in strategic games induced by these mechanisms. Their effectiveness hinges on the parties' preferences over the sets containing the required number of the candidates to be chosen.

Keywords: appointing arbitrators; appointing judges; rule of k name; split appointment rules; compromise; unanimity compromise set; top compromise set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-law and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1442

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