Safe Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium

Anand Chopra, Malachy James Gavan and Antonio Penta

No 1497, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Safe Implementation (Gavan and Penta, 2025) combines standard implementation with the requirement that the implementing mechanism is such that, if up to k agents deviate from the relevant solution concept, the outcomes that are induced are still 'acceptable' at every state of the world. In this paper, we study Safe Implementation of social choice correspondences in mixed Nash Equilibrium. We identify a condition, Set-Comonotonicity, which is both necessary and (under mild domain restrictions) almost sufficient for this implementation notion.

Keywords: implementation; mechanism design; robustness; safe implementation; mixed implementation; Set-Comonotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07
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