Foreign Influence and Identity Equilibria: A Model of External Intervention and Social Alignment
Esther Hauk
No 1523, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics
Abstract:
This paper develops a formal model to analyze how foreign interventions – via resource transfers towards mobilization, technological upgrades of the mobilization technology, and various forms of conditional aid – reshape identity choices and conflict dynamics in divided societies. After a foreign intervention occurred, individuals simultaneously decide how many resources to allocate to conflict and whether to identify as ethnic or national. Following Shayo (2009) the utility derived from identity decreases with the perceived social distance from the chosen group and increases with the group's status. Foreign interventions can modify identity choices by affecting perceived social distance or group status. Our results reveal that inclusive aid, as well as material support for mobilization are likely to induce national identification. Conversely, exclusive or ethnically targeted aid and technological upgrades of the mobilization technology are likely to result in ethnic identification. We show that for all types of interventions analyzed conflict mobilization is lower and the intervened nation's material payo§ is higher when individuals identify nationally than ethnically.
Keywords: ethnic salience; external conditional aid; foreign intervention; group status; intergroup conflict; social identity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F35 F50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1523
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