Tariffs and Technological Hegemony

Martin Wolf and Luca Fornaro

No 1530, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We provide a theory connecting trade policies to innovation and technological hegemony, based on the notion that high-tech clusters generate technological rents for the countries hosting them. We show that tariffs on high-tech imports may be used to steal technological rents from the rest of the world, by redirecting innovation activities from foreign to domestic firms. This strategy may lead to welfare gains, which however come at the expense of even larger welfare losses in the rest of the world. Tariffs may backfire even for the country imposing them if they are not well designed, or if the rest of the world retaliates.

Keywords: endogenous growth; high-tech; innovation; intangibles; international trade; tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 F12 F13 F42 F43 O24 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-int and nep-opm
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