Group Obvious Strategy-proofness: Definition and Characterization

Alejandro Neme, R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Massó

No 1533, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We introduce the concept of group obvious strategy-proofness, an extension of Li (2017)'s notion of obvious strategy-proofness, by requiring that truth-telling re- mains an obviously dominant strategy for any group of agents in the extensive game form implementing the social choice function. We show that this stronger condition is no more restrictive: the set of all group obviously strategy-proof social choice functions coincides with the set of all obviously strategy-proof social choice functions. Building on this equivalence result and on existing results on obvious strategy-proofness via extensive game forms with perfect information, we derive additional equivalences concerning the implementability of social choice functions: in this class of games, strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, obvious strategy-proofness, and group obvious strategy-proofness are all equivalent.

Keywords: (group) strategy-proofness; obvious strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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