Deception Under the Veil of Noise

Jawwad Noor and Fernando Payró Chew

No 1544, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study a dynamic predator–prey game in which a predator can conceal its movement under naturally occurring environmental noise. In the safe state, forest noise is i.i.d., whereas in the dangerous state the predator contributes additional noise as it approaches the prey. The prey updates her beliefs about danger from the realized noise sequence and chooses whether to remain vigilant. We characterize equilibrium patterns of noise generated in the forest and show that a marker for deception is a hot-hand effect, whereby streaks persist with increasing probability.

Keywords: belief biases; deception; endogenous information; optimal stopping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
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