Crowdfunding with Sequential Moves and Costly Common Value Signals

Matthew Ellman and Sjaak Hurkens
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Luca Fornaro

No 1548, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Cong and Xiao (2024) show that All-or-Nothing crowdfunding, modelled as a sequential game with observational learning and free private information, achieves efficiency and extracts all surplus in the asymptotic limit as the crowd size grows. Ellman and Hurkens (2025a) model investment-based crowdfunding as a simultaneous move game with costly information acquisition. They establish a single upper bound on per capita welfare and profit in symmetric equilibria that is shown to be tight in asymptotically large crowds. This paper shows that with costly information, sequentiality allows for strictly higher welfare but not for higher profit.

Keywords: information acquisition; crowdfunding; perfect bayesian equilibrium rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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