Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism

Róbert Veszteg and David Pérez-Castrillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 155, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.

Keywords: experiments; uncertainty; mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism (2005)
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