Efficient Bidding with Externalitites

David Wettstein (), David Pérez-Castrillo and Ines Macho-Stadler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 159, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.

Keywords: shapley value; Externalities; implementation; Bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient bidding with externalities (2006)
Working Paper: Efficient Bidding with Externalities (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:159

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