On reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games

Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

No 160, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We provide a different axiomatization of the core interpreted as a reasonable set (Milnor, 1952) and introduce a new property, called max-intersection, related with the vector lattice structure of cooperative games with transferable utility. In particular, it is shown that the core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonability, max-intersection and modularity.

Keywords: core; Cooperative TU games; reasonable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/1160-file.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:160

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().