Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

Antoni Calvó-Armengol (1970-2007), Coralio Ballester and Yves Zenou
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antoni Calvó-Armengol

No 178, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Finite population non-cooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an ownconcavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich-Nash linkage implies that aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identifed with an inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and her contribution to the centrality of the others.

Keywords: social networks; peer effects; centrality measures; policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C72 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player (2006)
Working Paper: Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Player (2005)
Working Paper: Who?s Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player (2005)
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