Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure?

Xavier Calsamiglia, Teresa Garcia-Mila and Therese J. McGuire

No 193, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: A notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorships or communism have been considering decentralizing fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing authority

Date: 2004-08
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure? (2006)
Working Paper: Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure? (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:193

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