An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments

David Wettstein () and David Pérez-Castrillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 26, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (T U ) games. We show a solution exists, and call it an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV ). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for T U games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Keywords: Non-transferable utility games; shapley value; ordinal shapley value; consistency; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D50 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments (2006)
Working Paper: An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:26

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