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Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets

Jaume Ventura, Alberto Martin and Fernando Broner

No 288, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of default penalties, sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. Without this assumption, foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties. This result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. Sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly. To reduce its effects, one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets.

Keywords: sovereign risk; secondary markets; default penalties; commitment; international risk sharing; international borrowing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 F36 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Sovereign risk and secondary markets (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets (2006)
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