How to choose a non-controversial list with k names

Salvador Barberà () and Danilo Coelho

No 291, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Barberà and Coelho (2006) documented six screening rules associated with the rule of k names that are used by different institutions around the world. Here, we study whether these screening rules satisfy stability. A set is said to be a weak Condorcet set à la Gehrlein (1985) if no candidate in this set can be defeated by any candidate from outside the set on the basis of simple majority rule. We say that a screening rule is stable if it always selects a weak Condorcet set whenever such set exists. We show that all of the six procedures which are used in reality do violate stability if the voters act not strategically. We then show that there are screening rules which satisfy stability. Finally, we provide two results that can explain the widespread use of unstable screening rules.

Date: 2006-10
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Journal Article: How to choose a non-controversial list with k names (2008)
Working Paper: How to choose a non-controversial list with k names (2006)
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