Selecting Negotiation Processes with Health Care Providers
Pedro Barros () and
Xavier Martinez-Giralt ()
No 30, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Two different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers. The second mechanism is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select a negotiated solution.
Keywords: bargaining; health care provision; any willing provider (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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