Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences

Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno (bernardo@uma.es)

No 325, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in comparing the relationships between different nonmanipulability notions under these two domains. On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossyness is equivalent to convex range. Thus, minmax rules are the only strategy-proof non-bossy rules. On the single-plateaued domain, only constant rules are non-bossy or Maskin monotonic; but strategy-proofness and weak non-bossy are equivalent to strict Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, strategy-proofness and plateau-invariant guarantee convexity of the range.

Keywords: Strategy-proof; Single-plateaued preferences; Single-peaked prefer-ences; Maskin monotonicity; Non-bossyness; Plateau-invariance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences (2008)
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