Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences
Dolors Berga and
Bernardo Moreno ()
No 325, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in comparing the relationships between different nonmanipulability notions under these two domains. On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossyness is equivalent to convex range. Thus, minmax rules are the only strategy-proof non-bossy rules. On the single-plateaued domain, only constant rules are non-bossy or Maskin monotonic; but strategy-proofness and weak non-bossy are equivalent to strict Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, strategy-proofness and plateau-invariant guarantee convexity of the range.
Keywords: Strategy-proof; Single-plateaued preferences; Single-peaked prefer-ences; Maskin monotonicity; Non-bossyness; Plateau-invariance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences (2009)
Working Paper: Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences (2008)
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