A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations

Cori Vilella, Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

No 327, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper deals with the strong constrained egalitarian solution introduced by Dutta and Ray (1991). We show that this solution yields the weak constrained egalitarian allocations (Dutta and Ray, 1989) associated to a finite family of convex games. This relationship makes it possible to define a systematic way of computing the strong constrained egalitarian allocations for any arbitrary game, using the well-known Dutta-Rayís algorithm for convex games. We also characterize non-emptiness and show that the set of strong constrained egalitarian allocations Lorenz dominates every other point in the equal division core (Selten, 1972).

Keywords: Cooperative TU-game; Strong Constrained Egalitarian Solution; Weak Constrained Egalitarian Solution; Equal Division Core; Lorenz Domination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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