Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation

Bettina Klaus () and Lars Ehlers

No 33, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Keywords: Indivisible objects; resource-monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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