EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A Characterization of Sequential Rationalizability

Miguel Ballester and Jose Apesteguia

No 345, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.

Keywords: consistency; bounded rationality; individual rationality; Rationalizability; behavioral economics; Voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/1345-file.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A characterization of sequential rationalizability (2008) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:345

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:345