Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets

Bettina Klaus (), Markus Walzl and Flip Klijn

No 357, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only solution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core.

Keywords: core; stochastic stability; (pairwise) stability; roommate markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Stochastic stability for roommate markets (2010)
Working Paper: Stochastic stability for roommate markets (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:357

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