Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets

Oriol Tejada and Carles Rafels

No 370, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We introduce a subclass of multi-sided assignment games that embodies markets with different types of firms that produce different types of homogeneous goods. These markets generalize bilateral Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We describe the geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is always nonempty. We also characterize the extreme points of the core and show that they are marginal worth vectors, although this does not hold for arbitrary multi-sided assignment games. Finally we show that prices that are obtained from core allocations are competitive and vice versa.

Keywords: core; assignment games; multi-sided markets; homogeneous goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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