Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

Daniel Cardona and Clara Ponsatí

No 375, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider negotiations selecting one- dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the ef- ciency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

Date: 2008-12
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Working Paper: Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules (2008)
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