Farsighted House Allocation

Bettina Klaus (), Markus Walzl and Flip Klijn

No 384, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.

Keywords: top trading cycles; housing markets; indivisible goods; farsightedness; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets; competitive allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Farsighted house allocation (2010)
Working Paper: Farsighted House Allocation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:384

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