Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do?

Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel

No 405, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: C91

Keywords: interdependent preferences; social welfare maximizing; Inequity aversion; belief elicitation; social information; experiments; mixture-of-types models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do? (2013)
Working Paper: Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do? (2009)
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