Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market

Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marina Núñez (mnunez@ub.edu)

No 412, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Existence of von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) is proved for any assignment game. For each optimal matching, a stable set is defined as the union of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with this matching. All these stable sets exclude third-party payments and form a lattice with respect to the same partial order usually defined on the core.

Keywords: assignment game; core; dominance; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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