Strategy-proof social choice

Salvador Barberà ()

No 420, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura

Keywords: voting; strategy-proofness; Social Choice; Dominant Strategies; Domain Restrictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D51 D7 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: Strategy-proof social choice (2010)
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